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This paper analyzes the entire reformist effort that spans from 1990 until 2002, 
emphasizing the second wave that ended with the issuing of a new labor code in 
2002. A successful reform has to surpass a set of “deals” along the streamline of 
design,  consensus  building  within  civil  society,  submission  to  Congress  and 
parliamentary debate, before it gets approved. The paper presents the story of two 
failed attempts for producing these “deals” within the government, along with labor 
unions and private sector firm confederations, before the 2002 labor reform was 
finally  enacted.  It  shows  what  economic  and  social  considerations  created  the 
need for reform, describes the actual policy changes implemented and evaluates 
their impact. The paper delves deep into the political aspects of the reform effort. 
Public officials of two governments pursued different lines of reform, discussion 
strategies  and  mechanisms  for  creating  consensus,  before  the  initiative  gained 
momentum and circumvented key obstacles. The text of the 2002 reform proposal 
changed  little  during  five  years,  but  received  important  additions  in  the  floor  of 
Congress,  with  little  technical  support.  Finally,  an  interesting  dispute  between 
lawyers and economists is presented regarding the role of the labor code for job 
creation  and  its  function  in  the  economic  cycle.  In  the  case  of  this  reform, 
economists  believed  more  on  the  computed  elasticities,  while  lawyers  believed 
more  in  the  stability  of  established  rules  and  in  the  limited  role  of  norms. 
Economists should pay more attention to the workings of the political economy of 
reform and to the “life cycle of government”, both of them critical for success. 
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Este trabajo analiza el esfuerzo reformista en el campo de la regulación laboral 
llevado a cabo desde 1990 hasta 2002, enfatizando la “segunda ola” que termina 
con la expedición de una nueva reglamentación laboral en 2002. Para que una 
iniciativa reformista sea exitosa debe sobrepasar un conjunto de negociaciones a 
lo largo de su período de diseño y aprobación, que pueden contemplar acuerdos 
con actores representativos de la sociedad civil y del parlamento. El documento 
presenta la historia de dos intentos de producir estas negociaciones al interior del 
ejecutivo,  con  los  sindicatos  y  los  gremios  del  sector  privado,  antes  de  que  la 
reforma laboral fuera finalmente sancionada. Se muestra cuales consideraciones 
llevaron a pensar en la necesidad de una reforma, se describen los cambios de 
política  implementados  y  se  evalúa  el  impacto  de  los  mismos.  El  documento 
analiza los aspectos políticos del esfuerzo reformista. El mismo fue adelantado por 
representantes de dos gobiernos, con diferentes estrategias de reforma y distintos 
mecanismos  para  crear  consensos,  hasta  que  la  iniciativa  ganó  el  ímpetu 
necesario para sobrepasar los obstáculos. El texto final de la reforma de 2002 
cambió  poco  durante  cinco  años,  pero  recibió  modificaciones  considerables  en 
pocas semanas por parte del Congreso, con poco de soporte técnico. Finalmente, 
se presenta una disputa interesante entre abogados y economistas respecto al 
papel del código de trabajo para la creación de empleos y en el ciclo económico. 
En el caso de esta reforma los economistas creyeron más en las elasticidades 
calculadas, mientras que los abogados dieron más crédito a la estabilidad de las 
reglas instauradas y al alcance limitado de reformar de las normas. Una lección es 
que los economistas deben prestar más atención a la economía política de las 
reformas y al “ciclo de vida del gobierno”, ya que estos dos elementos son claves 
para el éxito. 
 
Palabras  clave:  reforma  laboral,  sindicatos,  agenda  de  política  económica, 
economía política, empleo, informalidad. 
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1. Motivation and Methodological Approach 
 
This paper focuses on a particular episode of policymaking, asks how such policy 
initiative came to live, what were its motivations, the policy changes introduced, 
and  their  impact.  In  the  political  economy  realm,  it  inquires  how  the  normal 
interplay  of  interests  and  incentives  worked  together  to  achieve  intermediate 
agreements,  “deals”,  crucial  for  its  approval.  In  every  situation  of  “policy 
production”  there  are  winners  and  losers,  however  slack  their  definition  or 
identification might be. This implies, at least, two types of considerations: on the 
one hand, how to evaluate whether the end result is Pareto superior to the ex-ante 
one. And if it is not, as it is often the case, how to assess whether the gain from the 
winners is superior to the loss of the losers, an analysis that might involve value 
judgments or the possibility of computing gains and loses in comparable terms. 
Finally, the effects of a policy can be justified via social distributive considerations, 
which  would  imply  a  particular  set  of  priorities  and  the  allocation  of  costs  and 
benefits.  
 
The second set of considerations refers to the political economy involved in the 
policy production process. In this approach, it is recognized that different actors 
with distinct sets of objectives interact pursuing their own rationale and, as a result, 
either they promote or oppose the production process. These interactions can be 
understood as a group of “deals”, indispensable for the enactment of the policy 
initiative. The deals might be between two actors that may potentially profit from 
the policy outcome, but that need to distribute its products. Or between actors that 
might win or lose, and their interaction is about compensating measures. 
 
The policy production process follows a clear chain of events, contingent on every 
country’s institutional arrangements. This paper will be dealing with a modification 
of the labor code in Colombia, change that needs legislation. Hence, it is forced to 
pass trough Congress. Since only government or Congress can propose this type 
of initiative, the first step is to identify the objective origins of the policy proposal 
from a socio economic point of view. Then, it is required to analyze its formation 
and passage through Congress. From a political economy perspective it will come 
out,  though,  that  the  richest  part  of  the  interaction  and  negotiation  takes  place 
before the project is actually presented to Congress (the “formation” process just 
referenced), since once it reaches the floor of Congress, success (e.g. approval) 
can  only  be  achieved  if  the  crucial  agreements  already  took  place.  This  is  not   4 
always the case, but it is a characteristic of successful projects, as this paper will 
illustrate.  
 
The method then requires the identification of the relevant actors, their modes of 
interplay, the strategies they adopt, the way deals are reached or destroyed, and 
the  institutional  procedures  throughout  which  those  deals  materialize  in  a  new 
policy or regulation. In our case the actors are: (i) the different ministries involved in 
the reform of the labor code, basically, a) the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
(ML- later the Ministry of Social Protection, MPS), b) the Ministry of Finance (MF), 
and c) the National Department of Planning (DNP); (ii) labor unions; (iii) private 
sector  representatives,  normally  confederations  of  firms  of  different  productive 
sectors  (so  called  "gremios");  (iv)  Congress;  (v)  the  international  financial 
community (either the capital markets that focus on Colombia or the multilaterals); 
and (vi) the press, including all other actors that make themselves heard via the 
media. 
 
The  data  used  throughout  the  paper  are:  (i)  official  presentations  of  the  policy 
initiatives  and  drafts  of  reform  bills;  (ii)  versions  of  those  bills  in  their  passage 
through Congress, product of parliamentary deliberation and voting; (iii) statements 
of  purpose  written  by  or  for  congressmen,  where  the  initiative  at  hand  is 
substantiated; (iv) interviews with the actors involved; (v) minutes of the meetings 
between the Colombian government and the representatives of the unions and the 
private sector; (vi) letters of intent with the IMF and matrices of conditionality for 
adjustment loans with the IADB and the World Bank; and (vii) technical literature 
and reports produced by the actors mentioned above, related to the situation of the 
labor market and the reform process.  
 
The  exposition  will  go  through  the  analysis  of  the  pre-reform  situation  that 
motivated  the  modifications,  the  actual  policy  changes  proposed,  their 
implementation and, finally, their impact. This analysis will cover two reform waves, 
the first one comprising the end of 1980s-1991 and the second one between 1998-
2002. An important part of this succession is the political economy involved. To 
analyze this issue, the discussion will focus on the second wave and go, in a very 
detailed  fashion,  into  three  “deals”  that  took  place  before  the  final  project  got 
actually approved in 2002. The period in which these deals took place covers 5 
years, 1998-2002, in which there were two governments in Colombia (1998-2002 
and 2002- date).  
 
The streamline followed in these deals is similar since it is set by the institutional 
procedure  for  a  law  approval.  Of  course,  the  first  two  deals  discussed  were 
unsuccessful  for  reasons  interesting  to  understand.  Indeed,  along  this 
chronological exposition of the consecutive “deals” the whole set of interests and 
the  relative  strength  of the actors  involved  will  become  apparent,  enriching  our 
picture of what makes a policy initiative feasible or not. These three big “deals” 
mentioned are themselves composed of many small deals involving the different 
actors mentioned above. For a reform project to succeed, it is necessary to close 
all deals along the streamline of institutional decision-making. The failure of just   5 
one of them can destroy the whole approval process. The goal then is to present 
the  first  two  unsuccessful  deals,  trying  to identify  where  exactly  they  broke the 
chain of decision making, and which interests and interactions were involved. This 
is  our  methodological  approach  to  the  political  economy  of  labor  reform  in 
Colombia. 
 
The  paper  is  divided  into four sections,  after  this  introduction.  The  second  one 
analyzes the initial reform period (1989-1991), trying to identify the socioeconomic 
factors  that  brought  to  the  forefront  of  the  policy  agenda  the  need  for  a  labor 
reform. Also, the impact of the reform is presented. The third section delves deep 
into the political economy of the second wave of the reform (1998-2002), with the 
objective of understanding the main causes of failure of the intermediate “deals”. 
The fourth section analyzes the reform implementation and the existing evidence 
on its impact. The last section concludes.   
 
2. The 1990 Labor Reform and its Impact 
 
Labor reforms in Colombia began to be undertaken seriously in 1990. Until then, 
policies related to the labor market (pre-reform policies) were, as it was the case in 
much of Latin American, based on the protection and stability of employment. That 
is, labor regulations sought to (i) make it very hard for employers to fire workers; (ii) 
protect  and  increase  workers’  labor  income  (especially  for  those  perceived  as 
being  poor  or  more  vulnerable  to  economic  shocks);  (iii)  improve  working 
conditions; and (iv) discourage “excessive” job turnover. These objectives tried to 
be  accomplished  by  putting  in  place  a  set  of  “traditional”  instruments,  namely: 
strong hiring and firing regulations, provisions that obliged to pay extra charges to 
all workers for a variety of reasons (overtime and work on holidays, for example) 
and some regulations aimed directly at improving the quality of working conditions 
(vacations and codes of conduct, for example). 
 
Among these instruments, the first type (hiring/firing regulations) was perceived as 
critical in determining labor market outcomes at the end of the 1980s. Indeed, firing 
related provisions made it very difficult to fire any worker. First, as it was common 
in Latin America, for a worker to be fired there had to be a “just cause” on which to 
base such decision. Second, the worker had to be notified in written form of the 
decision at least one month before the actual dismissal occurred. Third and most 
importantly, the severance payments included in the Law were the highest non-
wage labor cost under the pre-1990 regime. Employees were entitled to one month 
worth of salary per year of work (based on the last salary). Partial withdrawals of 
such funds were allowed and deducted in nominal terms from the final payment, 
implying a form of “double retroactivity” (with an estimated cost of 4.2% of the total 
wage bill). Additionally, workers with more than ten years of tenure were able to 
contest the decision in courts if they deemed the firing as being “unjust”. Under this 
scenario, successful plaintiffs could oblige firms to rehire workers with back pay 
(foregone wages). 
   6 
As mentioned, these restrictions were believed to negatively influence a number of 
key  labor  market  outcomes  such  as  employment  creation  (i.e.  to  create 
unemployment),  formality  and  labor  productivity.  Regarding  these,  the  most 
noticeable effects of hard firing regulations are relatively well documented in the 
literature and are closely linked to the business cycle. Costs of dismissals cause 
firms to not shed labor during the lower part of the cycle because it is costly, even if 
necessary due to a lower marginal value of labor. On the other hand, in the upper 
part of the cycle, firms may want to hire more workers, but if they take into account 
the expected cost of each new worker, they will not necessarily hire all the required 
labor. This is reinforced by the fact that workers with ten or more years of tenure 
had a strong incentive to sue even if their firing was “fair”, because the expected 
payoff from this action was always positive. Workers might also avoid looking for 
(or  accepting)  more  productive  jobs  due  to  the  loss  of  accumulated  severance 
payments. The identified results are an inefficient allocation of labor that negatively 
affects productivity growth and a lower level of “equilibrium” employment, which 
may be translated into unemployment or a higher informality rate. In addition, they 
imply  lower  turnover  rates,  which  discourage  training  and  hinder  productivity 
growth.  Thus,  it  seemed  to  be  a  fact  that  the  labor  system  in  place  was  not 
compatible  with  the  simultaneous  processes  of  internationalization  and 
technological progress, which constituted the main goals that the new government 
(headed by President Gaviria) had it mind when entering office in 1990. 
 
Additionally, under the exiting Law it was quite difficult to hire for a temporary job, 
even if the task to be performed was indeed temporary. That is, under the Law, all 
labor contracts were to be considered as open-ended positions. In any case, the 
minimum  allowable  duration  of  a  “justified”  temporary  contract  was  one  year. 
Additionally,  only  in  very  specific  situations  could  the  labor  relationship  be 
considered  fixed  term  or  for  a  specific  assignment.  This  hiring  inflexibility  was 
believed to impair an efficient allocation of labor and hinder formal employment 
creation along the business cycle. This perceived difficulty arises because, among 
other reasons, the employer will have to prove that the work was indeed over when 
the contract was over.  
 
If working relationships are always considered permanent, there is no incentive for 
the employee to demonstrate his or her skills, even at the beginning of the working 
relationship. This ends up being reflected in either increased transaction costs in 
the hiring process (more thorough screening), or in hiring within a closed circle of 
individuals whose demonstrated skills are known to the employer or to his or her 
advisors.  For  these  reasons,  in  practice,  the  only  noticeable  effect  of  these 
restrictions  was  employers  trying  to  circumvent  them.  Employers  always  found 
ways, many times illegally, of hiring workers through informal contracts. So, in the 
end, a well-intended regulation ended up generating higher informality levels. In 
this sense, this specific set of regulations was believed to provide a poor service to 
both workers (by encouraging more informality and unemployment), and employers 
(by impairing their ability to adjust and use inputs efficiently). 
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Finally, it seemed to be an accepted fact (both in theory and empirically) that strict 
firing and hiring regulations were very effective in protecting the employment level 
and stability for certain groups of workers (formal workers, and even more for those 
unionized), while negatively affecting other labor market groups (mainly informal 
and some non-unionized salaried workers). These facts reflected what is known in 
the specialized literature as the “insider-outsider” model. 
 
Casual  observation  of  some  labor  market  outcomes  before  1990  provided 
empirical  support  to  the  conjectures  mentioned  in  the  previous  paragraphs.  In 
particular,  urban  unemployment  (especially  its  long  term  component  or  “natural 
rate”),  increased  steadily  during  the  second  half  of  the  seventies  and  eighties, 
stabilizing at a high level. After reaching a peak in March 1986 (14.6%), associated 
with a recession, unemployment rates declined somewhat and stabilized until 1989 
around  12%.  Bernal  and  Cárdenas  (2003)  attribute  a  significant  share  of  this 
persistent  high  level  of  unemployment  to  significant  labor  costs,  including  large 
dismissal costs, combined with a relatively high own wage elasticity. Informality 
also grew steadily in the eighties, while overall labor productivity (and Total Factor 
Productivity-TFP) declined since the end of the 1970s (see for example Loayza, 
Fajnzylber and Calderón, 2002). For example, while TFP yearly growth was 1.8% 
in average during the sixties, it fell practically to zero during the eighties.  
 
Of course, it is difficult to directly attribute these outcomes to the existing labor 
regulations. Some (scarce) evidence, however, leads to fairly robust conclusions. 
In particular, Kugler and Cárdenas (1999) show that before 1990 the presence of 
strict hiring and firing regulations reduced formal employment among hard-to-hire 
groups (mainly the young and individuals with intermediate levels of skill, the so-
called  “outsiders”)  and  increased  the  duration  of  unemployment  for  informal 
workers. They estimated that the hiring and firing regulations in force at that time 
increased  the  overall  unemployment  rate  by  at  least  10%.  Additionally,  those 
regulations kept turnover rates artificially low in the formal sector, a fact that lends 
support to the belief that the negative evolution of productivity in Colombia in the 
1980s was partially explained by stringent hiring and firing regulations in the labor 
market.  
 
Summarizing,  the  main  findings  of  these  and  other  authors  (Tockman  and 
Martínez,  1999,  for  example)  are  that  the  hiring/firing  regulations  reduced  the 
dynamism of the Colombian labor market during the 1980s, by decreasing the exit 
rates into and out of unemployment. Moreover, they also contributed to decrease 
compliance  with  labor  legislation  by  increasing  the  costs  of  formal  hiring  (i.e. 
promoted informality). As a result, the equilibrium unemployment rate was higher 
than it would otherwise be, while productivity growth was negatively affected due to 
the fact that the ability  of firms to use and combine inputs efficiently along the 
business cycle was seriously impaired. 
 
As a result, and taking into account the internationalization of the economy that 
occurred  in  1990-91  and  the  overarching  goal  of  increasing  economic  growth 
through  higher  productivity,  in  1990  the  government  introduced  a  labor  market   8 
reform that substantially reduced the costs of dismissing workers and widened the 
hiring modalities available for employers. That is, the main thrust of that reform was 
to  substantially  change  hiring  and  firing  regulations  (i.e.  affect  the  contracting 
stage), rather than modify other provisions, such as non-wage costs. Indeed, the 
reform reduced severance payments, broadened the definition of ‘just’ dismissals, 
extended the use of temporary contracts, and speeded up the process of mass 
dismissals.  These  changes  reduced  the  costs  of  firing  workers  covered  by  the 
legislation (reduced firing costs for formal firms but not for informal firms).  
 
Although the reform simultaneously introduced various legislative changes, the one 
major  policy  change  that  decreased  dismissal’s  costs  was  the  reduction  of 
severance  payments.  This was achieved in  two  ways: first,  prior  to  the  reform, 
employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year worked based 
on the salary at the time of separation. After the reform, employers were required 
to deposit a monthly contribution equivalent to one month of the yearly salary to an 
individual  severance  payments  savings  account  (“Fondo  de  Cesantías”),  which 
would  be  accessible  to  workers  in  the  event  of  separation.  Total  severance 
payments  were  reduced  because  the  payment  per  year  worked  was  no  longer 
based on the higher salary at the time of separation, and yearly nominal increases 
were not multiplied by the whole employee’s tenure.  
 
Also,  prior  to  the  reform,  workers  could  obtain  advance  payments  from  their 
severance to use for investments in education and housing, which would only be 
credited  to  the  employer in  nominal terms in  the  event  of  separation. After the 
reform, although the withdrawal of funds was still permitted, these ‘loans’ were now 
credited to the employer in real terms. According to Ocampo (1987), the fact that 
withdrawals  were  credited  to  the  employer  in  nominal  terms  before  the  reform 
implied,  on  average,  a  cost  of  35%  of  the  total  severance  payments  in  the 
manufacturing sector prior to 1990 (this is what became known as “retroactividad 
de las cesantías”). 
 
A second important modification introduced was related to indemnities for “unjust” 
dismissals. First, the definition of ‘unjust’ changed. Prior to the reform, “just” causes 
included  fraud,  violence,  undue  care,  sabotage,  discipline  problems,  deficient 
performance, and release of proprietary information. After the reform, the definition 
of  “just”  cause  dismissals  was  extended  to  include  any  dismissal  for  failure  to 
comply with firm regulations and instructions from supervisors. Second, the reform 
eliminated the ability of workers with more than ten years of tenure to sue for back 
pay and reinstatement. At the same time, however, the reform increased the cost 
of “unjust” dismissals for workers with more than ten years of tenure, which may 
have increased the incentives for firms to dismiss workers just before reaching 10 
years  of  seniority  (see  below).  Thus,  these  changes  in  the  “unjust”  dismissal 
legislation can be expected to have the greatest impact on formal workers with 
intermediate levels of seniority. An additional change introduced by the reform was   9 
a  reduction  in  the  advance  notice  for  mass  dismissals
1.  While  advance  notice 
requirements for mass layoffs existed prior to the reform, the reform introduced 
penalties to bureaucrats who did not process requests for mass layoffs quickly (the 
effectiveness of this change depends critically on whether the bureaucrats believed 
the threats or not). 
 
In terms of hiring regulations, the two most important changes were the extension 
of fixed-term contracts and the introduction of the so-called “salario integral” (all-
including  monthly  payments,  including  all  non-salary  outlays).  The  reform 
introduced the possibility of using fixed-term contracts for durations below one year 
(renewable  up  to  three  times).  The  “salario  integral”  eliminated  severance 
payments altogether and broadened the alternatives in terms of hiring modalities. 
This type of contract allowed formal workers who earned more than ten times the 
minimum  wage  to  opt  out  of  severance  payments,  indemnities  for  unjust 
dismissals,  benefits  (except  paid  vacations),  social  security  contributions,  and 
payroll  taxes  in  exchange  for  a  higher  salary.  The  introduction  of  this  type  of 
contract  effectively  allowed firms to eliminate the cost of dismissing highly  paid 
workers who opted for the “salario integral”.  
 
In sum, these changes were aimed at reducing dismissals costs for formal firms, 
giving them more alternatives for hiring and allowing higher turnover in the formal 
sector. The final goals were to remove incentives for informal labor relations, to 
increase employment and the pace of productivity growth.  
 
In a clear attempt to “compensate” the groups that were perceived as the losers 
from  this  reform,  government  and  Congress  introduced  a  special  provision 
regarding severance  payments.  As  it  was  clear  from the discussion  above, the 
main losers from the  changes introduced  were  workers  employed in the formal 
sector,  especially those  working in large firms complying  with labor regulations. 
Their  loss  came  from  both  the  forgone  severance  payments  and  the  reduced 
difficulty  to  separate  workers  from  the  firm.  The  main  “beneficiaries”  from  the 
reform were the active individuals (i.e. being part of the labor force) not covered by 
the  regulations.  Workers  in  the  informal  sector  and,  most  importantly,  the 
unemployed  were  thought  to benefit  the  most  from the reform, due  to the new 
opportunities of formal employment allegedly generated by the reform.  
 
The measure taken to partially compensate the loosing group, which, by the way, 
was  instrumental  in  allowing  the  bill  to  be  approved  in  Congress,  consisted  of 
increasing  the  severance  payment  due  to  “unjust”  separations  for  workers  with 
more than ten years of tenure. Workers with less than a year of tenure on the job 
were to receive 45 days worth of wages. In the event of separation, a worker with 
more than 10 years of tenure on the job used to receive 30 days for each extra 
year after the first. The new legislation increased the indemnity to the equivalent of 
40 days of wages per additional year. Figure 1, below, shows the steep increase of 
                                                 
1 Mass dismissals are those that occur due to bankruptcy or technological adoption, among others, which often 
imply the firing of a sizeable percentage of the staff in the firm (sometimes the entire 100%).    10 
severance payments after the 10
th year of tenure. The cost of this compensation 
was to be paid by employers directly, and indirectly by workers with less than 10 
years of tenure at the time of the reform, who were confronted to a decreasing 
likelihood of remaining in their jobs ten or more years (that is, the expected cost of 
maintaining a worker for more than ten years became too high for employers). In 
fact, Rojas and Santamaría (2001) showed that, after the reform, the conditional 
probability  of  reaching  10  years  of  tenure  (conditional  on  having  reached  nine 
years and on some set of personal attributes) decreased from around 35% to just 
5%. 
 
Figure 1: Severance Payments by Tenure 
 
The  solid  line  corresponds  to  the  severance  payment  schedule  after  the  1990 
reform 
Source: Rojas and Santamaría (2001) 
 
Within  the  broader  package  of  reforms introduced  in  1990-91,  the  labor reform 
appeared  to  have  fulfilled  its  objectives,  namely  reduce  unemployment  and 
informality and increase the pace of productivity growth. Urban unemployment fell 
continuously  from  12%  to  less  than  8%  between  1990  and  1994,  informality 
dropped more than two percentage points in the same period (from around 47.5% 
to 45%) in the same period, and labor productivity growth picked up somewhat at 
the beginning of the decade, after the disappointing performance in the 1980s. The 
question  here  is  how  much,  if  any,  of  these  positive  developments  can  be 
attributed to the 1990 labor reform, given the fact that practically every major area 
of economic policy was reformed in those years
2.  
 
The available evidence on the impact of the labor reform indicates that indeed the 
changes  introduced  had  a  positive,  though  limited,  impact.  First,  as  Figure  2 
illustrates, the modifications to the firing regulations produced a fall of about 4.5 
percentage points in total non-wage costs, which fell from 47.2% to 42.9% of the 
basic  salary  between  1989  and  1992.  On  hiring  regulations,  the  impact  of  the 
“salario  integral”  was  rather  low.  On  a  recent  survey,  medium  and  large  firms 
                                                 
2  Foreign  trade  tariffs  were  reduced,  the  financial  sector  liberalized,  the  capital  account  opened,  private 
participation in utilities and in infrastructure concessions for the first permitted and the Central Bank was turned 
independent in charge of controlling inflation and managing the exchange rate policy, to only mention the most 
important changes.   11 
answered that about 5% of the potential beneficiaries (i.e. those workers earning 
more than  10  minimum  wages)  are  working  under  this  kind  of  contract. Kugler 
(2003) also notes that the reform resulted in increased separations and accessions 
for formal workers relative to informal workers. Moreover, the increase in worker 
turnover was greatest among younger, more educated, and larger firm workers, 
who are most likely to have been affected by the reform. In this sense, the reform 
is believed to have positively impacted the evolution of labor productivity. Also, her 
estimates  suggest  that  the  reform  contributed  to  one  tenth  of  the  reduction  in 
unemployment,  which,  taking  into  account  that  unemployment  was  reduced  by 
about 4 percentage points (from 12% in 1989 to 7.8% in 1995), would mean that 
the reform was directly responsible for a reduction of 0.4 percentage points in the 
unemployment rate.  
 
Also, Bernal and Cárdenas (2003) found that the labor reform did have a positive 
impact on labor demand, but only through its effect on relative prices. That is, they 
argue that the reform helped in augmenting labor demand because of the reduction 
of  non-wage  costs,  but  that  it  did  not  affect  the  dynamics  of  adjustment  of 
employment  to  the  economic  cycle.  Given  their  estimates  of  the  elasticity  of 
employment  to  own  costs  (wage  and  non-wage),  the  reduction  of  firing  costs 
introduced by the reform would imply a higher effect on employment than the one 
estimated by Kugler, in the range of 1-1.5 percentage points. 
 
Figure 2: Non-Wage Costs as Percentage of Basic Salary 
 
    Source: Bernal and Cárdenas, (2003) 
 
Thus, in the first half of the 1990s there seemed to be positive evidence on the 
reforms’  results.  Of  course,  the  labor  unions  did  not  agree  with  this  line  of 
reasoning. However, after 1995 three major events brought back the subject of 
labor market regulations to the forefront of the policy-making agenda. First, the 
social security and health reform of 1993 (Ley 100 de 1993, fully implemented by 
1996),  significantly  increased  payroll  contributions.  Second,  an  unprecedented 
recession affected economic activity between 1996 and 1999. This event brought 
back the debate surrounding labor market policies, regulations and institutions due 
to  the  fact  that  it  was  apparent  that  the  Colombian  labor  market  did  not  have   12 
enough  flexibility  to  adjust  in  a  somewhat  less  painful  fashion  to  economic 
downturns. And finally, the internationalization of the economy from the beginning 
of the 1990s made evident that the labor supply found it difficult to adapt to the 
evolution of labor demand, driven by a process of technical upgrade required for 
the Colombian economy to be more competitive in the new, more integrated world.  
 
The first two points above had a direct effect on the labor market, while the third 
made itself evident in a more subtle way. The 1993 social security reform (Ley 100 
de 1993) increased total contributions for health from 7% of the basic salary (until 
1994) to 8% in 1995 and 12% afterwards. One third of the total contribution (4%) 
has  to  be  paid  by  the  employer  (same  proportion  as  in  the  old  system). 
Additionally, this reform increased pension contributions to 13.5% in 1996 (14.5% 
for workers that earned more than four minimum wages), from 8% of the basic 
salary in 1993. This increase was implemented gradually. Contributions were first 
raised to 11.5% in April 1994 and then to 12.5% in 1995. Employers currently pay 
10.1  percentage  points  of  the  total  contribution,  as  opposed  to  4.3  before  the 
reform. Figure 2, above, is eloquent regarding the steep rise of non-wage costs 
that employers faced after 1994. Total non-wage labor cost paid by the firm (as a 
percentage of the basic salary) rose from 42.9% in 1992-93 to 53% after the 1996. 
 
The slowdown in economic activity, on the other hand, caused a drastic reduction 
in  labor  demand  since  1996,  but  especially  after  1998.  This  situation  was 
compounded  by  a  sharp  increase  in  labor  participation  due  to  the  reduction  of 
households’ income, stemming also from the recession. Since 1996 and until 2000, 
urban  labor  participation  increased  by  an  estimated  4.5%,  which  translates  into 
about 800.000 new people looking for jobs (that is, some 200.000 entrants per year 
in  average).  The  combination  of  these  two  factors  led  to  an  unprecedented 
increase in the unemployment rate since 1996, which only stopped around 2001 
(see Figure 3).  
 
One of the key features of the Colombian labor market during this period was that 
most  of  the  adjustment  to  the  worsened  economic  conditions,  within  the  labor 
market, was borne by the employment level (that is, wages were not able to “help” 
in the adjustment process). It suffices to note that the level reached by the urban 
unemployment rate in September 2000 (20.5%)  was the  highest in the modern 
Colombian  economic  history.  Informality  and  under-employment  also  grew 
considerably  during  the  period.  The  other  side  of  the  coin  was  a  declining 
employment rate since 1996. López (2001) reports that this indicator declined from 
56% to 53.5% during this period.  
 
Under  this  scenario,  the  discussion  shifted  somewhat  from  hiring  and  firing 
regulations (as it was the case in 1990) to the costs of labor (wage and non-wage) 
and their negative effects on the adjustment of the labor market to the economic 
cycle. The costs of labor in Colombia are composed of the wages plus (i) extra 
charges (overtime, work on holidays, etc.); (ii) earmarked taxes on the payroll to 
finance  welfare  programs  for  the  entire  population  in  the  areas  of  training,   13 
childhood development and other subsidies (what is known as “parafiscales”); (iii) 
health and social security contributions; and (iv) firing and other contractual costs.  
 
Hiring  and  firing  regulations  continued  to  be  an  important  aspect,  insofar  they 
affected the adaptability of the labor input with labor demand in a more competitive 
environment internationally. These two points (the shift in priorities and the “new 
role” of hiring and firing regulations) will be analyzed in more detail in what follows, 
seeking to clarify their precise meaning within the broader context of labor reform. 
 


















































 Source: DANE (Local statistical Agency) 
 
 
3.  The 2002 Labor Reform and its impact 
 
A.  Background and Content of the Reform 
 
So, by 1998 it was clear that one of the main challenges that the new government 
would have to confront was unemployment. Thus, an entire team of technocrats 
began to diagnose the problem recognizing the diversity of its causes (including a 
team of lawyers at the Ministry of Labor). Some of them were “structural” problems, 
while  others  were  related  to  the  economic  cycle,  as  explained  above.  It  was 
apparent that labor regulations were salient between the two groups, to the extent 
that  they  made  the  labor  market  quite  inflexible,  complicating  its  adjustment 
(economic  cycle)  and contributing  to  maintain the long-term  unemployment  and 
informality rates high (structural). Additionally, it was recognized that the new, more 
integrated economic environment required qualified workers with a high ability to 
adapt to new technologies  and to manage information. This was interpreted as 
implying a profound reform to the overall education system, but especially to the 
job training system, combined with more flexible hiring modalities, less restrictive   14 
 
 
   
 


























firing regulations and more innovative ways of organizing and managing the time 
within firms. The final goal would be to avoid a growing mismatch between the 
supply and the demand for labor due to changing conditions in the labor market. 
 
It was argued that the recession brought to the forefront the structural problems of 
the  labor  market.  In  particular,  as  mentioned  above,  high  non-wage  costs, 
combined with inflexible wages shifted almost completely the adjustment of the 
labor  market  on  the  only  available  variable:  the  quantity  of  employment.  The 
argument rested, first, in the increase of the social security contributions described 
above, which counteracted the beneficial effects of the labor reform of 1990, plus 
other two, more profound observations. First, it was noted that, in sharp contrast to 
any market, including the informal labor market, the formal labor market did not 
show  any  kind  of  price  (wage)  adjustment, even during  the  worst  years of  the 
recession (1998 and 99). On the contrary, wages kept growing during that period. 
Thus,  employment  fell sharply.  Figure  4  illustrates  this situation. The left  panel 
contains  the  evolution  of  real  wages  and  unemployment,  while  the  right  one 
portrays the evolution of the minimum wage and the unemployment rate.  
 















But, the labor market adjusted in its own way, which unfortunately turned out to be 
the most painful one. Figure 5 illustrates the mechanism. In the first years of the 
decade,  informal  employment  diminished  somewhat  (right),  while  formal 
employment  was  growing  strongly  (left).  But  when  the  economic  environment 
turned for the worse, the situation reversed itself: in the informal sector wages were 
able to adjust downwards and informal employment grew. In the formal sector, on 
the other hand, wages kept growing and thus the adjustment took place reducing 
employment. Additionally, it was noted how most of the employment that was being 
generated  was  of  a  temporal  nature,  while  permanent  employment  declined 
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In this sense, the Colombian labor market adjustment had two phases. In the first 
one,  nominal  wages,  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  were  fixed.  In  deed,  the 
exchange rate regime was a band and the nominal rate was pegged at its weak 
end. Hence, the only way to adjust the shock was via changes in quantities: the 
unemployment  rate  increased  sharply.  This  is  similar  to  the  Argentinean  case 
during the currency board regime. After the exchange rate was allowed to float, an 
important part of the labor market, mainly the producers of internationally traded 
goods and services, could adjust via the change of labor costs and domestic inputs 
in  dollars.  In  this  case,  the  adjustment  of  the  economy  was  via  income  of  the 
working classes and of those producers whose prices were fixed in pesos (non-
internationally-traded).  Employment  probably  kept  falling  for  these  non-traded 
sectors, but sales and labor demand recovered in the traded ones. This was the 
case in Mexico and Argentina under the flexible exchange rates regime.  
 
The second “more profound point” was the increase of labor costs throughout the 
1990s and the growing discontent on the part of the employers for being the sole 
financers of a host of social policies through the “parafiscal” taxes, which amounted 
to 8% of the payroll. The ILO estimated that the labor costs in Colombia, measured 
in  dollars,  grew  by  3.1%  per  year  during  the  decade.  This  was  the  result  of  a 
completely inflexible set of costs, as described above, including a variety of outlays 
that  made  the  situation  for  employers  unsustainable,  especially  during  the 
recessive  period.  The  employers  rightly  considered  that  they  had  to  endure  an 
excessive  burden  by  financing  the  training,  childhood  and  subsidy  programs 
funded with parafiscal taxes
3.  
 
Taking  these  considerations  into  account,  in  2000  after  a  long  debate  among 
various government agencies, the strategy to fight unemployment was based on 
                                                 
3 In addition, there existed evidence that these programs (excepting the childhood ones) were not providing a 
good service to their target population (see for example, World Bank, 2003). It was also argued that these 
taxes should have diminished when the social security and health contributions were raised in 1993. Thus, the 












































































































































































































































































￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿  16 
three  main  pillars.  First,  an  in  depth  reform  to  the  education  system,  including 
tertiary education financing and job training. Second, the implementation of a social 
safety net that would help the most vulnerable strata of population to cope with the 
effects of unemployment. Third, a reform of the labor code that responded to the 
problems stated in the previous paragraphs. That is, a reform aimed to: (i) reduce 
and flexibilize non-wage costs; (ii) introduce mechanisms that would help to make 
wages  more  flexible,  either  through  the  mean  wage  channel  or  through  the 
minimum wage one; and (iii) provide a wider variety of hiring modalities and ways 
to organize the time within the firms. 
 
The first attempt to pass a reform with these characteristics was made in 1999, 
during the first year of the Pastrana government. This attempt failed and no bill was 
even sent to Congress due to other more pressing concerns on the part of the 
government (see next section). The second one, which built on the first trial, was 
carried out in 2001 and was more successful in the sense that a reform bill was 
presented  to  Congress,  although  it  was  defeated  there.  This  second  attempt, 
however,  was  instrumental  in  two  respects  for  the  final  success  of  the  new 
government (headed by President Uribe) to pass a new labor legislation at the end 
of 2002. First, it contained most of the policy changes deemed as important and 
most of the topics were adequately covered. Thus, it allowed the new government 
to act quickly and take advantage of its high popularity and political support to get 
the reform approved. Second, during the discussions and negotiations surrounding 
the Pastrana reform proposal, the team in charge had been able to build support 
for it in some segments of Congress and among the employers and other sectors 
of  civil  society.  This  fact  accelerated  the  discussion  of  the  new  bill  through 
Congress, and facilitated the consensus building with other political factions and 
interest groups.  
 
This  second  reform  bill  prepared  by  the  economic  team  of  President  Pastrana 
sought to fulfill precisely the three objectives listed in the paragraph before the last. 
For this purpose, it included the following provisions related to non-wage costs and 
time use:  
 
(i)  The reduction of the parafiscal taxes from 8% to 5% of the payroll, which 
directly reduced non-wage costs.  
(ii)  The introduction of the apprenticeship contract, which allowed firms to 
hire “apprentices” and pay them a wage below the minimum and to avoid 
the payment of parafiscal taxes for a certain period (the duration of the 
training  provided).  This  instrument  sought  to  flexibilize  the  wage 
structure, to reduce non-wage costs and to offer the employer a wider 
range of hiring modalities. In addition, it provided an opportunity for hard 
to employ groups (the young with intermediate education, for example) 
to  acquire  expertise,  and  gave  employers  the  incentives  to  train 
individuals for the tasks they really needed.  
(iii)  The  introduction  of  the  “regular  working  shift”  (RWS)  as  a  way  of 
reducing non-wage costs and make more efficient use of the time. This 
figure  simply  established  that  there  would  be  a  regular  shift  of  work,   17 
agreed between the employer and the employee, and that this shift could 
be  at  any time  or cover  any  days  of  the  week, as long  as  it  did not 
surpass 48 hours per week. Hours in excess of this number or outside 
the RWS were to be paid with a surcharge of 40% over the regular wage 
or  by  providing  equivalent  rest  time.  This  sought  to  eliminate  extra 
payments for nocturnal work (the Law in force established that any work 
performed between 6 PM and 6 AM was to be considered nocturnal), or 
for work in holidays if the RWS included those. The only provision was 
that if the RWS included Sundays or holidays, the free time should be 
replaced  with  another  day  for  rest.  This  measure  was  thought  to  be 
especially  useful  for  sectors  such  as  retail  commerce,  hotels,  or 
entertainment services, whose hours of work do not necessarily coincide 
with the usual definitions of diurnal time or rest days; and  
(iv)  As a complement of the introduction of the RWS, the Law established 
that if, for any reason, work should be needed on a Sunday or a holiday 
outside the RWS (non-regular), it would be remunerated either by paying 
double wages or by providing a compensating rest day. This measure 
effectively  reduced  non-wage  costs  because  the  legislation  in  force 
stated that work on those days should remunerated with double wages 
and a compensating day of rest. 
 
In terms of hiring and firing regulations, the main proposals of this reform bill were 
the following:  
 
(i)  To reduce the floor at which it was possible to use the “salario integral” 
figure to something between three to five minimum wages;  
(ii)  To  allow  employers  to  hire  workers  by  the  hour,  as  long  as  wages, 
contributions  and  other  non-wage  costs  were  paid  proportional  to  the 
time worked; and  
(iii)  To eliminate the steep increase of the severance payments in the tenth 
year of tenure. For this purpose, the proposal established that severance 
payments would be of 45 days of wages for the first year of tenure, and 
20 days for every year after the first. In this way, the severance payment 
schedule looked like the dashed line of Figure 1. 
 
Thus, this reform proposal was seeking to complement and go beyond the policy 
changes introduced in 1990, basically by deepening the reforms related to hiring 
and firing regulations and by attacking the problems of lack of wage flexibility and 
an excessive level of non wage costs
4. As mentioned before, this reform proposal 
was defeated in Congress, but the new Uribe administration embraced it and made 
it  one  of  its  priorities.  Indeed,  they  presented  to  Congress  a  “social  protection 
reform” package, which included labor and pension reform proposals. The labor 
reform was similar to the one just described, including some important changes. 
                                                 
4 Other policy changes were included in the proposal, basically covering the possibility of training employees 
during  the  regular  work  shift  and  also  covering  some  aspects  related  to  collective  bargaining;  we  do  not 
highlight them here since they were not very profound and lied outside the main overall objectives of the bill.   18 
First, the Uribe administration removed the provision of eliminating “parafiscales” 
because it deemed it politically unfeasible, and instead included softer provisions to 
flexibilize them. It stated that any new blue-collar hire was to be exempt of paying 
parafiscal taxes for a maximum of four years (although there are some detailed 
restrictions on the kind of workers eligible for this exemption, and also no more of 
10%  per  firm  of  the  payroll  can  be  exempt  at  any  moment).  Obviously,  this 
measure  reduces  the  contributions  effectively  paid  by  employers,  and  also 
encourages formal employment creation
5.  
 
The reform also excluded the payment of parafiscal taxes for students under 25 
years of age working part time (this was included in Congress). Additionally, the 
reform further reduced the compensation for work outside the RWS or on Sundays 
(to 75% of what was established in the previous proposal), and also went beyond 
in  reducing  severance  payments  in  the  case  of  “unjust”  dismissals.  Workers 
earning below ten minimum wages were to be paid 30 days for the first year of 
tenure and 20 for any additional year. Workers with wages above ten minimum 
wages would get 20 days of wages for the first year and 15 for the following ones. 
On  the  negative  side,  the  deepening  of  the  salario  integral  instrument  was  not 
included in the final bill.  
         
B.  Some Initial Political Economy Issues 
 
As  it  is  always  the  case  in  this  kind  of  reforms,  the  main  losers  were  formal 
workers, especially those belonging to strong unions and large firms. The reform 
package did not include any specific provision to compensate them, and no special 
measure was taken with this purpose. The only “carrot” was a provision to evaluate 
the  impact  of  the  reform  at  the  end  of  2004.  A  commission  composed  by  the 
government, representatives of workers and employers, and members of Congress 
should carry out the evaluation. If the results were negative, the Law orders to 
change those provisions that are gauged negative, or to completely reverse the 
reform.  
 
However, the reform did include  a  host  of social protection measures aimed  at 
gaining  political  and  popular  support,  many  of  them  proposed  by  Congress.  In 
effect, the “social protection system” was created with the objective of providing 
protection for the most vulnerable segments of the population against income and 
employment  negative  shocks.  For  the  first  time  in  Colombian  history,  it 
contemplated the creation of unemployment insurance, the strengthening of public 
pension and health programs, the creation of a special micro-credit program for 
small enterprises and the introduction of unemployment subsidies for physically or 
mentally  challenged  individuals.  In  addition,  the  Law  introduced  a  “subsidy  of 
employment”, consisting basically of a monetary transfer from the government to 
medium and small enterprises which hire unemployed households heads for blue-
collar jobs.   
 
                                                 
5 This measure was on top of the exemption given to the apprentices.   19 
Let us identify the main interest groups related who played an important role in this 
process. Among them, it is possible to find the strongest opponents of the reform 
efforts, since they benefited from a very protected and inflexible labor market. The 
first group, already mentioned, is composed by formal sector workers, especially 
those  unionized  and  working  in  medium  and large  firms, for  whom  this  type  of 
reform represent a direct threat to income and employment stability. This group 
has been very vocal and always active in the discussions surrounding any reform 
effort.  They  have  been  successful  in  delaying  the  passing  of  reforms  by  using 
strikes and other political manifestations. Part of their success has been based on 
their ability to mobilize other powerful groups that are not directly affected by the 
reforms, such as the public teachers’ union, university students and pensioners. 
This group has considerable disrupting power. However, formal employees have 
not been very successful in getting their core message through. That is, despite 
being always present in the discussions surrounding labor reforms, their postulates 
have not been included in the final set of policy changes, or only marginally. Thus, 
it seems that their main interest is to delay or avoid reforms altogether, rather than 
shaping its content.  
 
The second group is by far the strongest one. It is composed by various subgroups 
that fiercely defend the existence of parafiscal taxes. The main subgroups within 
this broader interest group are: (i) the workers’ unions of the public and private 
agencies that administer these contributions and provide the services funded with 
them. These institutions are the welfare institute (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar 
Familiar  -  ICBF),  the  public  training  institute  (SENA)  and  the  Cajas  de 
Compensación Familiar (CCFs). All of them are large agencies with strong unions. 
These institutes manage about $750 million (approx. 1% of GDP) per year. This 
large amount of money provides stable and well-paid employment to some 25.000 
people in each and every region of the country. Any attempt to eliminate or even 
reduce the parafiscal taxes is, therefore, a direct blow to their livelihood and their 
families’. Hence, the opposition to any such measure is fierce and, as it was also 
the  case  with  formal  workers,  they  are  able  to  mobilize  wide  support  for  their 
cause, especially among the teachers’ union; (ii) blue collar workers (particularly 
those  unionized)  who  directly  benefit  from  the  services  funded  with  parafiscal 
taxes,  especially  those  provided  by  the  CCFs  (SENA  and  ICBF  provide  their 
services to the entire population)
6; and (iii) members of Congress, majors, state 
governors and other career politicians for whom SENA and ICBF are the preferred 
places  to  service  their  political  clientele.  In  effect,  those  institutions  have  been 
traditionally staffed with employees coming from political recommendations, and 
the large amounts of money that they handle have been very prone to be utilized 
with political objectives.  
 
Thus,  any  attempt  of  reform  parafiscal  taxes  and  the  functioning  of  those 
institutions could be said to receive opposition “from within”. The strong opposition 
made  by  these  groups  explains  why  the  parafiscal  system,  and  the  agencies 
themselves,  have  been  so  successful  in  avoiding  profound  reform,  even  in  the 
                                                 
6 CCFs provide cash and in-kind subsidies to their beneficiaries, which are formal sector workers.    20 
presence  of  a  strong  technical  background,  economic  evidence  and  strong 
governmental will. The delays and the small pace of the policy changes in this 
regard may be costing a lot to the country, in terms of resource allocation, public 
sector  finances  and  welfare  losses.  These  costs  have  not  been  systematically 
assessed yet. 
 
One important point surrounding this discussion is that the main “beneficiaries” of 
the  reform  efforts,  namely  the  unemployed  and  the  informal  workers  and  their 
families, have never had much say in the final outcome of the reforms or in the 
discussions surrounding them. As it is always the case, that is due to their very 
weak position and to the natural dispersion of these groups, which avoids forming 
a “unified front” that allows them to fight for their point of view. Moreover, the lack 
of understanding of the true objectives of the policy reforms has resulted many 
times  in  these  groups  being  co-opted  by  other  interest  groups,  like  the  ones 
mentioned  above,  to  fight  for  their  cause  (i.e.  to  oppose  the  reform)  with  the 
argument that these reforms are just a way to enrich the employers (by reducing 
their costs) and to generate more unemployment and informality.  
 
4. The Political Economy of the 2002 Labor Reform 
 
A.  The First “Deal”: the Ministry of Labor and the Economic Team at 
the Beginning of the Pastrana Government 
 
The 2002 labor reform had actually an interesting genesis, since the people who 
masterminded it were neither economists, within the realm of the so called neo-
liberal intellectual camp, nor public officials from the technical staff of the Ministry 
of Finance or the National planning Department
7, nor the multilateral institutions 
(e.g. World Bank, IMF or IADB). The people who actually inspired this reform were 
lawyers at the Ministry of Labor. Indeed, the initiators were a group of practitioners 
with  a  long  experience in  labor  disputes  between  private  firms, unions  and the 
government, led by the first minister of labor of the Andrés Pastrana administration, 
a lawyer trained in constitutional law.  
 
                                                 
7  These  two  institutions  are  the  public  sector  think  tanks,  responsible  for  most  of  the  economic  reform 
packages in Colombia The National planning Department of Colombia (DNP, for its acronym in Spanish) is a 
think tank composed by approximately 250 professionals, 5% with Ph. D. qualifications, 30% with master’s 
degree,  usually  in  foreign  universities,  65%  with  training  in  economics,  engineering,  agricultural  and 
environmental economics, and social sciences. Most of the staff is confronted with public finance issues. Its 
organizational structure reproduces that of the Central Government since it is in charge of allocating public 
sector investment. Hence, it monitors the sectoral behavior of the economy and the evolution of public sector 
policies,  projects  and  intervention.  Its  technical  staff  is  regarded  to  possess  better  and  most  consistent 
knowledge of the workings of the public sector, surpassing the particular ministries. It acts as an office of the 
presidency, is part of the presidential cabinet, and coordinates the National Council of Economic and Social 
Policies  (CONPES  for  its  acronym  in  Spanish),  where  the  key  public  policy  decisions  on  agriculture  and 
manufacturing, infrastructure, health, education and social security, environment, justice and armed forces, 
decentralization,  urban  development  and  utilities  are  made.  Such  council  is  presided  by  the  President  of 
Colombia and is conformed by eight ministers, the Governor of the Central Bank, the Head of the Coffee 
growers’ federation, and representatives of social groups. The CONPES technical documents, drafted by the 
DNP and publicly available, constitute the memory of public policies in Colombia, with a tradition of already 35 
years. It is similar to the Ministry of the Economy in other countries.    21 
They started thinking of this reform as a result of a group of papers that had been 
produced in the middle of 1998 by a private think tank, Fedesarrollo, within an 
agenda of research led by James Heckman and Carmen Pagés, and financed by 
the IADB. In particular, the newly  appointment Minister of Transportation  of the 
Pastrana Administration had participated in that research project and produced a 
paper on the determinants of labor demand (Bernal and Cárdenas, 2003).  
 
The  paper  concluded:  “quite  on  the  contrary  [to  the  belief  that  the  relevant 
elasticities  are  low  and  the  efficiency  gains  associated  with  labor  reform  are 
relatively  weak],  the  payoff  of  reducing  labor  costs  is  substantial.  …  These 
elasticities range from -0.45 to -0.52, depending on the type of labor.” The paper 
presents different estimation methods and more evidence on particular productive 
sectors,  and  also  numbers  for  skilled  and  non-skilled  labor  where  the  elasticity 
figures are lower; and also quite substantial elasticities for output (between 1 and 
2). It also analyses the impact of changes in regulation on adjustment costs. “The 
conclusion  is  that  changes  in  severance  payments  and  costs  of  dismissal, 
associated  with  the  1990  labor  reform,  did  not  affect  the  path  of  employment 
adjustment.  …  Structural  reform  did  not  change  the  relevant  elasticities.  This 
means that the main effect of regulatory changes affected labor demand through 
their impact on labor costs. Since these costs have increased it is likely that the net 
effect of labor, health and pension reforms has been a reduction in employment 
generation. According to the estimated elasticities in the dynamic framework, an 
elimination of the 9% payroll taxes could result in a 1.3% increase in employment 
in the urban areas. … [It also concludes that] the wage elasticity of labor demand 
increases (in absolute terms) during contractions. The impact of output growth on 
employment is also larger during recessions than during expansions. In this sense, 
we found an asymmetric labor demand response to the business cycle conditions.” 
 
The Minister of Labor was less convinced of the conclusion that labor reform itself 
was instrumental in creating jobs. He also considered that the goal should not be to 
reduce  hardly  won  labor  concessions.  Instead,  he  viewed  labor  reform  as 
eliminating possible obstacles to labor creation, once economic recovery started, 
for which some cumbersome elements of the labor contract should be smoothed, 
rather than forthrightly attempting to reduce labor costs. This view was shared by 
the  two  groups  of  lawyers  gathered  around  him,  one  in  the  Faculty  of  Law  at 
Universidad Javeriana, where he used to be a professor, and another one at the 
Ministry of Labor. In doing this, he was pursuing a task agreed upon with members 
of the economic team and promoted also by private firms.  
 
Notice that the vision of the technical paper, which can be said to reflect that of the 
economic team at that time, was more aggressive in terms of labor costs reduction 
and in transforming the structures of the labor code, like severance payments, non-
wage costs and payroll taxes. In contrast to economists, the lawyers viewed the 
key channels for job creation differently, and focused on other type of solutions. 
This mattered down the road at least in two senses: (i) there was not a unified 
vision on what to do for job creation; and (ii) at different points in time it was not 
easy to convince the economic team of this version of labor reform.   22 
 
The main issues included in the Ministry of Labor proposal were: 
 
(i)  Reduction of the labor shift from 8 to 6 hours for firms with more 
than two shifts per day.  
(ii)  Diurnal  shift  until  9:00  P.M.  (previously,  the  cost  per  hour  was 
higher after 6 P.M., due to the night shift). 
(iii)  Differentiation  between  “regular”  Sunday  work  (without  extra 
payment but the compensation with another free day during the 
week;  for  hotels,  museums,  restaurants,  etc.),  and  “occasional” 
Sunday work (with twice as much the cost per hour).  
(iv)  No extra remuneration for holidays work, but and additional day 
for rest.  
(v)  A  rise  in  the  severance  payment  for  workers  with  less  than  5 
years of tenure; keep it constant that of workers between 5 and 10 
years; and reduction for those with more than 10 years, making it 
equal to the previous group.  
(vi)  Reduction of the “Salario Integral” (i.e. without non-salary costs) 
threshold from 10 to 3 minimum wages (i.e. approximately from 
$1,500 to $450).  
(vii)  The creation of a contract specified in terms of number of hours 
worked. 
 
Once the first draft of this reform was written, the minister called for a meeting with 
members of the economic team. The purpose was to socialize the proposal within 
the  government,  understanding  that  to  make  it  an  actual  project  of  law  to  be 
submitted to Congress, it would need the no objection from the powerful Ministry of 
Finance and DNP. The labor reform would had to find a place within the legislative 
initiatives presented to Congress, an already loaded package including projects for 
sub-national government finances, like the modification of transfers to the regions, 
the  pension  system,  financial  responsibility  and a  new lotto; as  well nationwide 
initiatives, like a tax and pension reforms, the four-year national development plan, 
mandatory  for  every  new  government,  and  the  following  year’s  budget. 
Additionally,  the  legislative  agenda  contemplated  a  new  Chapter  11  Law  for 
helping the private sector whether the difficult recession period and a reform to the 
mortgage financing system, in deep disarray  and causing considerable  harm to 
households and the financial system. Figure 6 registers when these projects were 
presented  to  Congress,  and  how  did  they  advance  through  the  House  of 
Representatives and the Senate.   
 
Most of these reforms touched deep chords of the Colombian (or any country’s) 
economic and institutional arrangements. They were undertaken in the midst of a 
difficult  macroeconomic  situation,  which  we  will  touch  upon  ahead,  and  were 
proposed  by  a  conservative  government,  which  only  counted  on  20%  of  a 
Congress mainly dominated by the liberal party. Their approval though, implied a 
well functioning Congress coalition. The way the system has traditionally worked in 
Colombia is through an entente between the governing party and (some fraction of)   23 
the mayoritarian liberal party. The governing coalition was called Alianza por el 
Cambio,  following  the  name  of  the  movement  that  took  Mr.  Pastrana  to  the 
presidency. This was indeed an alliance of three types of forces: the conservatives, 
the center-right wing of the liberal party, and another group of liberals, harder to 
identify ideologically, that tends to side with whoever is president (opportunistic).  
 


























Source: DNP. Original power point presentation of March 9, 2000. 
 
Facing  such  a  complicated  legislative  agenda,  it  was  not  easy  to  convince  the 
economic  team  of  the  urgency  of  a  labor  reform.  The  lukewarm  reception  to  it 
among the economic team was partly due to the fact that more urgent challenges 
were  piling  up  in  the  macroeconomic  front.  Indeed,  their  priorities  pointed 
somewhere else, as it appears in many official documents and presentations of 
that  time.  One  of  those  memos,  dated  in  March  1999
8,  presents  the  economic 
recovery strategy of the government. It states: “although some key prices like the 
exchange and interest rates already started to align after the speculative attacks 
against the weak end of the exchange rate band, which led to the abandonment of 
that exchange regime, there are still worrisome signals of recession. It is the case 
of  the  decline  in  domestic  credit,  which  reveals  both,  demand  and  supply  side 
problems in the financial markets”.  
 
The  document  describes  also  a  negative  spiral  in  the  making,  driven  by 
expectations on asset prices, especially real state. “The argument is as follows: 
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Advance (as of Mar. 2000) of the Projects of law or Constitutional 
reform presented to Congress since Aug. 1999    24 
aggregate  demand  is  depressed  due  to  the  unwinding  of  the  Keynesian  shock 
used by the previous government between 1997.I and 1998.I, and due also to the 
balance sheet adjustment, both in firms and households. Both of them suffered 
from (i) an increase in liabilities, due to over-borrowing during the 1990s and to the 
increase in interest rates in 1998; and (ii) the fall in the value of assets as a result 
of the bust in the real state bubble. Households have benefited from the policies 
attending mortgage indebtedness. But private firms’ refinancing will rely on their 
own internal resources since the financial system is not willing to help, until its own 
balance sheets are not clean again. Non-performing loans are rising as well as the 
risk perception in the financial system. Hence, new lending will not flow and thus, 
aggregate  demand  and  the  prices  of  assets,  particularly  real  state,  will  remain 
depressed, which closes the circle of negative spiral”. 
 
On yet another front, in the middle of 1999 the Colombian Government decided to 
go to the IMF for an economic program, in order to improve its standing vis-à-vis 
the international financial community
9. The political economy of this move is also 
interesting  in  itself,  since  until  then  the  Pastrana  government  had  resisted 
pressures form the Department of State and from the multilaterals to pursue this 
line of action. The Colombian Government argument had been that in establishing 
a table of negotiations with the guerrilla group FARC, it could be quite damaging to 
pursue a program to the IMF, in which Colombia had not been since 1974
10, and 
that it would be blamed for anti-popular reforms and impositions form the foreign 
powers.  
 
The  reasons  to  finally  ask  for  an  IMF  program  were  the  persistence  of  a 
unsustainable  fiscal  situation  (high  and  persistent  central  government  and 
consolidated  public  sector  deficits),  steady  increase  in  public  debt,  a  delicate 
balance  of  payments  situation,  a  financial  sector  crisis,  specially  in  public  and 
mortgage banks, and a highly complicated international environment due to the 
Asian (1997), Russian (1998) and Brazilian (1999) crises. The Confidence in the 
Colombian  economy  was  faltering  and  help  from  the  multilaterals  was  badly 
needed
11.  
                                                 
9 In a press release of Sep. 24 1999, the IMF states that: “Management of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the Government of Colombia have reached understandings on all the key elements and policies that 
would  support  Colombia' s  economic  program  for  2000-2002.  After  concluding  some  technical  work  that 
remains and the normal process required to finalize the documentation, Colombia' s proposed extended fund 
facility (EFF) program will be presented to the IMF' s Executive Board for consideration.” The whole package 
with the multilaterals included contingent FMI resources of US$ 2.7 billion; as well as fresh lending from IDB, 
US$ 1.7 billion; World Bank, US$ 1.4 billion; CAF (the Andean countries’ multilateral bank), US$ 0.6 billion and 
FLAR (The Andean countries’ international reserves fund) US$ 0.5 billion.  
10  During  1984-86  Colombia  had  a  monitoring  program  with  the  IMF,  but  no  actual  Stand-by  Program. 
Colombia was one of the few Latin American countries that avoided a formal IMF program during the eighties 
and the nineties, and that punctually honoured all its obligations. For that a record the country’s sovereign debt 
was awarded Investment Grade by the rating agencies. 
11 The program signed by the Colombian authorities, an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) credit for the period 
through 2002, “is an IMF financing facility that supports medium-term programs that seek to overcome balance 
of payments difficulties stemming from macroeconomic imbalances and structural problems. The repayment 
terms  are  10  years  with  a  4  ½-year  grace  period.”  See, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1999/nb9974.htm.  However,  the  Colombian  Government  never   25 
Let us summarize, then, the political economy landscape during 1999, when the 
labor reform hit for the first time the discussion table. As it is evident in Figure 7, 
the Colombian government found itself in the middle of powerful players, each of 
them  with  their  own  serious  worries  regarding  the  sustainability  of  the  whole 
political and economic equilibrium in the country. Of course, the characterization of 
the  elements  involved  in  the  relationships  with  every  one  of  these  players 
surpasses the scope of this paper. We will focus on the political economy of labor 
reform,  but  the  figure  reveals  the  richness  of  the  political  economy  landscape 
during that time. 
 



















A brief comment on the peace process with the guerrilla group FARC is due, since 
it considerably influenced the attitude of the unions towards government proposals, 
as well as the methodology adopted during year 2000. This is an illegal armed 
force that was founded in the early sixties by frontier peasants, as a residual of the 
so-called liberal guerrillas present then in the country. Originally these people did 
not have a particular leftist revolutionary orientation, but with time and the support 
of the mostly urban Colombian communist party acquired it. Their major strength 
lied on being a frontier, armed group, of former colonizers of Colombian common 
land. Indeed, the country still has a lot of wild forest, basically untouched. These 
areas provided them with a hideout vis-à-vis the military.  
 
The 1960s and 1970s lived a boom of urban guerrilla groups in Latin America, 
most  of  which  were  brutally  dismantled  by  the  dictatorships  or  strong  civil 
governments of the 1970s and 1980s. This was not the case in Colombia, where 
                                                                                                                                                     
contemplated disbursing it; it considered the EFF as a “spare  tire”, according to the Minister of Finance’s 
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conservative  governments,  like  Betancourt  (1982-86)  and  Pastrana  (1998-2002) 
ended up seeking an agreed end of the war, and liberal ones, like Turbay (1978-
82), Barco (1986-90) and Gaviria (1990-94) resulted quite more aggressive and 
only partially effective against the whole guerrilla movement. Some actual truces 
have been reached during the last decades, saliently with the M-19, which partially 
led to a new constitution in 1991, and with the EPL, also at the beginning of the 
1990s.  These  two  groups  demobilized  and  entered  civilian  life,  participating  in 
politics until now. The FARC changed completely in character (see Bottia, 2003) 
once Colombia became the world biggest producer of cocaine. Indeed, this illegal 
drug is cropped and processed mostly in the jungles, and the traffic towards the 
international markets mostly departs from runaways close to the jungle (Echeverry, 
2003). Of course, the guerrilla’s traditional position in those areas provided them a 
“comparative advantage” to, first, offer security to drug producing units, and then to 
get involved in this business directly. 
 
President Pastrana was elected after two particularly telling episodes. First, the 
vote of ten million Colombians in favor of a peaceful solution with the guerrillas. 
Second,  a  highly  publicized  encounter  with  the  head  of  the  FARC,  Manuel 
Marulanda (a.k.a. tirofijo, sure shot), in the interim between the first and the second 
round of presidential elections. By then FARC allegedly dominated whole territories 
of Colombia, had adopted kidnapping and drug trafficking as its mains sources of 
finances, and had jumped from 3 thousand fighters to 16 thousand, and was able 
to  defeat  the  military  in  several  encounters  between  1996  and  1998.  These 
episodes  led  the  new  president  and  the  Colombian  establishment  to  the 
convincement that a negotiated peace was the only way out with FARC. The peace 
process officially started at the beginning of the 1999, and in principle, no issue 
was left out of the agenda of discussion. The agreement between the Government 
and  guerrilla  negotiators  was  to  start  discussing  the  “Economic  model  of 
Colombia”
12. The peace process went on until the beginning of 2002, few months 
before the next presidential election, when President Pastrana was convinced of 
FARC’s lack of willingness to actually advance towards a final negotiation. 
 
Summarizing  the  elements  discussed  so  far,  the  priorities  of  the  Colombian 
Government were basically set by the crucial processes and actors portrayed in 
Figure 7. It needed badly to restart economic growth, which fell 4.3% in 1999, the 
first yearly GDP decline in seventy years. It sought to reestablish the confidence in 
the  international  capital  markets,  as  sovereign  debt  spreads  had  started  to 
fluctuate along with those of its Latin American neighbors, between 400 and 700 
basic points (bps) during 1999, and to counter the loss of cherished public debt 
investment grade. It accepted the corset of an IMF program to credibly commit to a 
fiscal agenda and a deficit reduction path. It kept trying to secure its Congress 
coalition, in order to grant governability. And last but not least, it was in the middle 
of a muddy peace negotiation with a powerful and consolidated guerrilla group, 
                                                 
12 The authors of this piece actually participated in training the Government’s negotiators in different topics, 
among them, labor market functioning and regulation; and also explaining to both sides of the negotiating table 
what could be understood by the “economic model”, and the feasible ways for its transformation.   27 
well  financed  and  armed,  which  controlled  lucrative  business  and  productive 
territories of the country. 
 
The legislative agenda was defined, first, to grant fiscal sustainability, both in the 
central and sub-national governments. And second, to tackle the difficult issues of 
private sector economic recovery (new Chapter 11) and household finances (new 
mortgage financing; see Figure 6). Additionally, it had to be crafted very carefully to 
not introduce excessive noise to the peace negotiations. It is understandable, then, 
that the reception to the first draft of the labor reform fashioned by the Ministry of 
Labor was not embraced by the economic team. The clearest manifestation of this 
state of mind was the shift in agenda and in the cabinet occurred in the August 
1999, which included the replacement of the Minister of Labor, and the elimination 
of  labor  reform  from  the  legislative  package.  Instead  of  being  submitted  to 
Congress, it was put on hold. However, soon unemployment would become the 
main worry to the Colombian economy, and the attention came back to the labor 
market, as referenced above. 
 
B.  The  Second  “Deal”:  Different  Views  of  the  Economy  and  of 
Unemployment  
 
The  year  2000  witnessed  a  different  set  of  events,  led  by  the  governability 
question.  It  all  started  at  the  end  of  March  when  some  corruption  scandals 
involving the heads of the Senate and the House of Representatives led to a new 
political strategy by the executive. President Pastrana had unsuccessfully tried to 
approve a political reform in 1999, denied by Congress. Considering that with a 
new scandal Congress will be weak, the president proposed the political reform via 
a referendum
13. According to a poll, the approval rate of this proposal was 82%, 
and  the  president’s  popularity  jumped.  Since  any  referendum  needs  first  to  be 
approved  as  a  law,  and  hence  to  surpass  congressional  voting,  the  president 
implicitly  menaced  congressmen  saying  that  he  might  use  “other  forms”  of 
pressure  (i.e.  impeaching  congress)  if  the  parliament  rejected  the  referendum 
(cited in Revista Semana, ed. No. 935, Apr. 5, 2000). The relationship between 
executive and legislative became tense. Events evolved quite rapidly, and in the 
approval  process  the  Congress  included  the  possible  impeachment  of  the 
president, a move that negatively affected governability. The international financial 
markets  reacted  with  spread  increases  to  this  sequence  of  events,  and  left  no 
alternative to the president but to withdraw the original project of the political reform 
via referendum. 
 
                                                 
13 The text of the proposed referendum sought: 1) Downsizing congress, 2) eliminating state assemblies, 3) 
downsizing municipal councils, 4) political death for corruption, 5) changing the electoral system to strengthen 
political parties, 6) roll call voting in congress, 6) separating the administrative management of congress from 
congressmen, 7) eliminating deputies for congressmen, 8) assimilating the congress pension system to the 
general one, and 9) finally asking the Colombian people if wanted to elect a new congress at once. (Revista 
Semana, ed. No. 935, Apr. 5, 2000) 
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This situation weakened the executive and led to a restructuring of the political 
equilibrium. The first move, crucial for our subject, was a shift in the policy agenda. 
To understand the context, let us review the evolution in the economic front. Once 
the  exchange  rate  and  the  interest  rate  corrected  their  misalignment,  and  the 
current account moved towards equilibrium, the main worries concentrated on the 
fiscal imbalance and the record high rate of unemployment. The former required a 
reform of the pension and regional transfer systems, which touched deep chords of 
the Colombian political and social system. The latter demanded the recovery of 
economic activity and also a reform of the labor code. However, the executive did 
not count at that moment with the political muscle to present legislative reforms 
with a real probability of success. 
 
The president convoked a round of discussions with key actors to advance in these 
three topics (transfers, pensions and labor), before congress reopened on July 20, 
2000.  The  people  gathered  were:  (i)  the  leaders  of  labor  unions  (CGTD,  CTC, 
CUT, the most important worker’s unions); (ii) the federations of economic sectors, 
gathering  private  firms    (agribusiness,  big  and  small  manufacturing  firms,  and 
commerce); (iii) the political parties (liberals, conservatives and the movement Sí 
Colombia);  and  (iv)  the  universities.  Three  Discussion  Tables  (Mesas  de 
Concertación)  were  established,  one  for  labor  reform,  another  one  for  regional 
transfers, and finally one for pension reform. The purpose was twofold, to create a 
better  atmosphere  for  reform,  and  to  produce  a  consensus  text  to  submit  to 
Congress. Also, these discussion tables should balance the one established with 
the FARC, and to bring more actors to propose new reforms for Colombia’s future.  
 
The deliberations took place between the beginning of June and the end of July of 
2000, a period when Congress rests. We will elaborate on the dealings of the labor 
reform discussion table, but first let us mention another significant event that took 
place in July. Before the parliament resumed the second period of sessions, on 
July  20
th,  it  was  imperative  to  improve  the  relationship  with  the  executive.  In 
particular, the liberal party loudly asked for a fairer treatment and a better channel 
of communication. This  was  achieved  by  the  appointment  of a  new minister  of 
finance  from  the  liberal  party.  Simultaneously,  a  former  union  member  was 
appointed  as  ministry  of  labor  in  order  to  gather  within  the  cabinet  the  whole 
political  spectrum  of  conservatives,  liberals,  and  the  democratic  left.  This  new 
arrangement  lasted  until  the  end  of  the  government,  and  although  it  created 
problems  for  labor  and  pension  reforms,  it  played  a  crucial  role  in  securing 
governability for the remaining of the Pastrana government. 
   
The  labor  reform  was  presented  to  the  discussion  tables  by  the  head  of  the 
National  Planning  Department,  the  institution  that  until  the  end  of  the  Pastrana 
administration championed this and the pension reform. The Ministry of Finance 
concentrated  in  approving  a  new  tax  reform,  and  both  institutions  forcefully 
defended  the  critical  reforms  of  regional  transfers  and  of  public  health  and 
education systems. This new package became the new economic agenda of the 
Pastrana  Government.  Note  that  microeconomic  reforms  started  to  be  forward 
looking, compared to the ones proposed in the first half of the government, also   29 
critical, but designed to deal more with the problems generated by the recession 
(New  Chapter  11  and  new  mortgage  financing  system).  Also,  notice  that  the 
defense of the labor reform shifted form the Ministry of Labor to the economic team 
(DNP and to a lesser extent MF).  
 
What happened in the labor reform discussion table? This was almost a laboratory 
on the political economy of labor reform. Let us describe the basic tenants of each 
group of actors. First, the proposal presented by the economic team analyzed the 
cyclical and permanent (structural) components of unemployment, attributing the 
former to the recent fall in economic activity, and the latter to the evolution of labor 
supply, accelerated due to higher participation rate.  Some share of this increase in 
labor supply was also due to the cycle, but the last decades had witnessed a wave 
of women and  young people  entering the labor market at rates  unseen  before. 
Another important element was the rise in labor costs as a result of the increases 
for  pension  and  health  contributions,  as  well  as  the  Colombian  system  of 
subsidizing social services
14 (parafiscales). Finally, labor supply and demand had 
shifted  away  from  each  other,  as  the  productive  sector’s  labor  demand  moved 
during the 1990s towards high skilled workers and outsourcing, avoiding high firing 
costs and burdensome stability clauses of the labor code. Hence, the Government 
defended that higher growth and a change in the labor code were the solution to 
the unemployment problem. Remember that for the first time in Colombian history, 
during 2000 urban unemployment rate reached 20.5% and national unemployment, 
16.3%. 
 
The response of the labor unions to this diagnosis was that the problems were not 
lower growth or the regulation of the labor market, but the “Model of Development” 
of  Colombia.  Their  line  of  reasoning  was:  Neo-liberalism  and  the  Washington 
Consensus have been applied at the beginning of the 1990s, internationalizing the 
economy, reducing tariffs, allowing the indiscriminate inflow of short term capital 
and imports of all sorts. Also, Central bank independence, granted in the new 1991 
Political  Constitution,  had  practically  banned  printing  money  for  anti-cyclical 
purposes. As a result, Colombian competitiveness had been harshly affected, and 
the Government did not have tools for countering a recession. Finally, along with 
those  macroeconomic  reforms,  the  neo-liberal  camp  enacted  a  labor  (Law 
50/1990) and a social security reform (Law 100/1993), which promised to create 
more employment and to balance the troubled pension system, but never really 
delivered. The real solution for unemployment was dismantling the institutional and 
economic  arrangements  derived  from  such  agenda,  and  abandoning  the 
recessionary IMF  program. What was  needed, in their view,  was to protect the 
internal  market,  increase  wages  and  protect  employment  stability  to  re-activate 
internal demand and, through this channel, generate more formal employment.  
 
                                                 
14 The institutions that receive parafiscales are: the National Job Training Service (SENA for its acronym in 
Spanish,  2%),  the Family Welfare  System  (ICBF,  4%),  and  the so  called  Compensation  Institutions-CCFs 
(2%), which intermediate subsidies mostly to the middle classes, in form of cash, cheaper goods and services 
in special supermarkets, health services and holyday facilities. As it was shown in Figure 2, all these costs add 
up to 53% of labor costs.   30 
Interestingly,  the  labor  unions  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  all  governmental 
initiatives already presented to Congress, until an agreement have been reached in 
the discussion tables, or else they would abandon such negotiations. Finally, they 
strongly rejected any challenge to the rights already granted in the current pension 
and labor codes. Implicitly, their demand was that any  reform should affect the 
newly employed, or the new people contributing to the pension system, but not 
their constituencies composed by the incumbents.  
 
The most articulate presentation from the political parties came form one with the 
lowest representation in Congress (if any), but whose representatives had been 
decisive players in designing the labor and pension reforms at the beginning of the 
1990s,  the  movement  Sí  Colombia.  They  presented  a  vision  where  the  main 
problem of the Colombian economy was indeed unemployment, but one to which 
the government seemed insensitive. They defended the need for an unemployment 
coverage (subsidy without contribution, proposed the unions), and were ambiguous 
on the need for a more flexible labor code, an attitude attributed to the fact that 
they were already in campaign for the next presidential election. Interestingly, they 
separated  the  unions’  positions  from  that  of  the  unemployed,  adding  that  the 
former were actually against the interest of the latter. Hence, the presence of the 
representatives  of  the  unemployed  was  asked.  Finally,  they  showed  that  the 
adjustment  of  the  labor  marked  would  come  either  in  shift  of  the  prices  (real 
wages) or of the quantities (number of jobs). Finally, they argued that what was 
urgently  needed  to  reactivate  the  economy  and  generate  employment  was  to 
reduce public spending (an stop crowding out of private investment) and to give the 
possibility to the most vulnerable groups of becoming asset owners (their definition 
of assets included productive and financial assets, plus entrepreneurship).  
 
The federation of big manufacturing firms (ANDI for its acronym in Spanish) was 
against  the  “model”  discussion,  and  rather  proposed  that  the  key  issue  was 
competitiveness  and  the  creation  of  truly  productive  jobs.  It  was  also  the  only 
private  sector  representative  that  accepted  that  the  labor  code  might  have 
problems and should be reformed. The federation of commerce spoke against the 
elimination  or  reduction  of  parafiscales,  arguing  social  considerations.  The  real 
reason,  however,  is  that  many  of  its  affiliates  directly  benefit  from  those 
contributions. The federation of agribusiness (specially representing the cattle and 
meat  industry)  stated  that  the  causality  in  Colombia  went  from  violence  to 
unemployment, and not the other way around, as the labor unions have defended. 
Finally, the federation of small manufacturing firms warned against the belief that 
firing people was good business. 
 
Once the labor unions accepted to evaluate the government’s proposal (which was 
the only one on the table), an appealing discussion developed. On analytical terms, 
the decisive issues for the effectiveness of a labor reform are: (i) will flexibilization 
in hiring and firing lead to higher formal job demand? (ii) Will a reduction in non-
wage costs be actually translated into more hiring or just into higher profits? (iii) Is 
labor  demand  actually price-elastic? (iv) Are  young people  able  to benefit from 
flexibilization  of  norms  favoring  their  hiring,  or  their  lack  of  skills  and  of  a  first   31 
employment will hopelessly condemn them to unemployment? These are empirical 
questions, whose definite answer depends on the phase of the cycle (elasticities 
change along it), along with the type of productive sectors likely to embrace the 
new easiness and cheapness for hiring new employees. Hence, the answers to 
each of these questions depend on empirical conditions in the country at hand. In 
these  circumstances,  however,  economists  exert  their  privileged  access  to  a 
wealth of data on elasticities, computed for Colombia or similar countries, as well 
as to the old truths of economic theory. Theses questions received probably not 
completely satisfying answers from the economic team, but nonetheless, the best 
ones available. In the final analysis, in every action of intervention in the economy, 
there  is  a  considerable  ignorance  on  certain  aspects  of  the  economy  at  that 
moment,  a  diagnosis  which  corresponds  to  a  view  of  the  economy,  and  a 
component of faith regarding the true elasticities, the interplay of incentives and the 
reaction of relevant economic actors.  
 
Unions’ leaders reacted with their own data, probably gathered less systematically 
and  presented  less  elegantly,  but  nevertheless  similarly  powerful  rhetorically, 
defending the arguments already presented. The reaction of a congresswoman, 
invited to the discussion, to this interchange of elasticities and empirical evidence 
on  the  past  of  the  labor  market  is  worth  mentioning:  she  said  that  these 
discussions were way too technical for the floor of parliament, and that any reform 
would need a broader consensus to be presented in that arena. Whether people at 
the  table  of  discussion  got  finally  convinced  of  either  side’s  opinions  was 
immaterial due to the turn of events that were about to happen.   
 
As already mentioned, President Pastrana appointed as Minister of Labor a former 
charismatic union leader, with vast experience in negotiations, and no appetite for 
an unpopular labor reform that would certainly enrage his constituency right at the 
beginning of his tenure. Also a new Director of the DNP was appointed by the 
president  (coauthor  of  this  paper,  and  former  deputy  director),  and  on  his  first 
presentation in public, during a meeting of the confederation of big manufacturing 
firms,  offered the  blueprint  for labor  reform that  had  been  discussed  within the 
economic team. To begin with, its name had been changed from “flexibilization”, 
already  a  bad  word  in  the  labor  sector  argot,  to  “adaptability”.  The  idea  was 
presenting the reform as achieving a better matching between labor demand and 
supply.  This  is  more  than  semantics,  since  it  recognized  that  this  was  not  an 
attempt  to  modify  the  labor  code  and  to reduce  non-wage  payments, minimum 
wage  or  other  deep  arrangements  of  the  labor  market.  Instead,  it  aimed  at 
smoothing the functioning of this particular market, more in the vein defended by 
the lawyers at the beginning of the government, than in the one championed by the 
economists. The key elements of the proposal were: 
 
(i)  Reduction of the labor shift from 8 to 6 hours for firms with more that 
two turns per day. 
(ii)  Creation of the RWS. 
(iii)  Differentiation  between  “regular”  Sunday  work  and  “occasional” 
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(iv)  No extra remuneration for holidays work, but and additional day on 
vacations. 
(v)  Change in the severance payment schedule. 
(vi)  “Salario Integral” from 3 minimum wages on.  
(vii)  Options for participation on firms’ profits. 
 
According to the technical staff of the DNP, the reductions in labor costs resulting 
from such reform could generate between 200 thousand and 350 thousand new 
jobs in the following three years.  
 
Either the media understood the explosive situation and immediately interviewed 
the newly appointed labor minister, or he considered this the perfect opportunity to 
launch  an  attack  on  such  an  initiative,  but  the  immediate  result  was  a  huge 
controversy in the media, loudly voiced by the minister and echoed by all the union 
leaders. The storm ended a couple of days later when the president said that such 
proposals were actually being considered within the government, and that the new 
minister of labor should come up with a better alternative for job creation to the 
internal  discussions.  This  put  an  end  to  that  particular  debate,  but  not  to  the 
permanent disagreement during the following two years between the minister of 
labor and the economic team (minister of finance and head of planning), on labor 
and pension reforms. The former made it absolutely clear that his signature was 
indispensable for submitting a government labor reform to Congress, and that that 
was out of question as long as he was minister. 
 
This put an end to the intention of actually presenting a labor reform, but not to the 
campaigning of the government economists for it. In repeated presentations of the 
economic  team  the  issue  was  raised  and  kept  alive.  And  finally,  the  reform 
proposal, drafted by the government, was presented to Congress at the end of 
2001, but as being conceived and designed by  a small group of congressmen. 
That is, the trick was to make the bill look to have been born from within Congress, 
and not from the government. The final draft presented to Congress included the 
reforms just referenced, plus the reduction of parafiscales from 8% to 5% of the 
payroll. Although it was finally defeated in the discussion in Congress, this bill was 
instrumental for creating a public discussion around it and for selling the idea to 
key players in society. In particular, the economic teams of the candidates to the 
2002 presidential elections became sensible to the reforming diagnosis. Some of 
them  had  participated  in  the  discussion  tables  the  middle  of  2000,  and  were 
intellectually and personally closer to the officials from the economic team.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that along this period the IMF, the World Bank and the 
IADB  insisted  in  including  labor  reform  as  part  of  the  Letters  of  intent  or  as 
conditionality for some loans. The Pastrana Government systematically rejected 
these requests since there  was no consensus within the  economic team of the 
feasibility of this reform in Congress, and there was the conviction that this type of 
reform losses credibility if it appears in any form as an outside imposition.  
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In saying this, it is important to stress that the reform experience in Colombia has 
shown that it takes years of slowly “selling” a reform to key newspapers analysts, 
congressmen, former presidents and directors of political parties, representatives 
of  the  productive  sector  and  the  academia,  until  an  initiative  actually  gains 
momentum. During these periods, it is normal to observe that actors that at some 
point defend some reform can turn against it, or the other way around. The tides of 
opinion  and  the  relative strength of  diagnoses shift  quite  dramatically,  and  it  is 
frequent that people who had opposed a proposal end up approving it in Congress, 
or defending it in the press at some point.  
 
C.  The  Third  “Deal”:  a  New  Government  Embraces  the  Reform 
Initiative 
 
The  new  government’s Minister  of Labor championed the approval  of the  labor 
reform, this time without the enthusiasm of his colleague from the MF. The reason 
was  that  the  latter  was  worried  by  some  new  articles  including  unemployment 
subsidies that were about to create additional expenditure pressures, inadequate 
for  the  fiscal  reality  of  the  country.  Another  interesting  fact  is  that  the  reform 
blueprint was the one presented by the previous government, as it was described 
in the previous section. The main additions from the Uribe Government were the 
unemployment  subsidy,  reviving  the  reform  of  the  on-the-job-learning  contract 
(apprentice contract), which the Congress committees slightly modified, and the 
inclusion  of  the  Compensation  Institutions  (CCFs)  as  key  for  social  distributive 
policy. 
 
The Congress committees included a series of articles directed to create demand 
for  SENA  students,  the  mandate  to  the  government  to  create  incentives  for 
independent workers to register in the social security system, reduction in payroll 
taxes for firms that hire people between 16 and 25 years old and older than 50, 
among the most important. 
 
A  final  element  is  the  statement  of  purpose,  written  by  the  congressmen  who 
presented the initiative, and which is clearly addressed to the Constitutional Court, 
which became another important actor within this reform. In particular, this court 
could  reverse  the  final  Law,  once  approved  by  Congress,  if  it  deemed  it  as 
standing  against  the  rights  of  the  people,  or  if  it  found  any  mistake  in  the 
procedures to get it approved. The statement develops a long and deep argument 
explaining how this type of reform it is not against the Estado Social de Derecho (a 
mixture of the Social Welfare State and the capitalist property rights system), which 
is  at  the  beginning  of  the  1991  Colombian  Constitution.  Indeed,  the  Court  has 
already a tradition of controversial rulings imposing to the executive all types of 
mandates, basically justified on interpretations of that concept of the state. In this 
case, Congress wanted to armor the reform against one of those rulings, since this 
labor reform actually affected workers and modified some existing arrangements of 
the labor code.  
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(*) CI: Compensations Institutions. 
 
 
5.  Reform Implementation and Evaluation  
 
A.  Evaluation 
 
Although it is still too soon to make a rigorous assessment of the reform effect on 
key labor market outcomes, the government has claimed that there are some initial 
positive  signals.  These  signals  correspond  to  the  higher  pace  of  employment 
generation in 2003 and reductions in unemployment duration and informality. Of 
course,  many  factors  affected  those  outcomes,  but  a  simple  statistical exercise 
allowed  partial  disentangling  of  the  pure  reform  effects.  Additionally,  the 
government carried out a survey among employers to gauge the impact of some 
specific provisions.  
 
Regarding  employment generation,  the  local  statistical  agency  (DANE)  reported 
that  between  June/02  and  June/03 more  than  750.000  new  jobs were created, 
which would be translated into a high growth rate of about 5% of the employment 
rate, compared to a 3% growth of GDP. The percentage growth of employment in 
this period more than doubled the one observed in the previous year (June/01-
June/02). Importantly, this behavior concentrated in urban areas, where the effects 
of the reform are expected to be greater.  
 
The  statistical  exercise  referenced  above  (a  simple  decomposition  procedure) 
revealed that about 60% of that increase was due to economic growth alone. Thus, 
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40%  (300.000)  of  the  new  jobs  were  generated  by  other  factors,  attributed 
particularly to the labor reform. The informality rate also declined from 61.5% to 
60% during the period. But what seems to be more important is that, for the first 
time since 1997, in 2003 the formal sector was more dynamic than the informal 
one in terms of job creation. In the main urban areas formal employment grew by 
5%, while informal employment rose by only 2%. Unemployment duration, on the 
other hand, declined from 53 to 49 weeks in the same period. 
 
Probably the most convincing piece of evidence comes from the employers, who 
assess  in  a  special  survey  that  the  reform  has  impacted  them  positively.  The 
survey was directed to 75 formal firms in diverse sectors of the economy (medium 
size most of them). The focus on formal firms was due to the fact that they are 
expected to benefit from the reform. First, 41% of the surveyed employers said to 
have increased the number of workers between June/02 and June/03. Close to 
20% of them (i.e. 8% of the total, about 15 firms) said that they did so because of 
the  labor  reform  introduced  in  2002.  This  group  stated  that  a  very  effective 
incentive was the reduction of the cost of Sundays and holidays’ work, while 80% 
answered that the reduction in the cost of nocturnal shift was instrumental as well. 
Other  instruments  that  were  deemed  important  were  the  employment  subsidy 
(40%) and the exemption of parafiscal taxes (25%).  
 
Additionally, 37% of the firms surveyed stated that they had increased the number 
of apprentices due to the provisions included in the labor reform in this regard. The 
survey also asked about the future: 20% of the firms responded that they plan to 
increase their payroll in the next three months. Among these, 47% said that they 
would be able to do so because of the incentives provided by the labor reform. In 
particular, the incentives that they consider the most important in the near future 
are the exemption of parafiscal taxes (30%), the reduction in nocturnal costs of 
labor (29%), the fall in the costs of work on Sundays and holidays (28%) and the 
subsidy for employment creation (20%).  
 
Finally, the social protection programs introduced by the reform are in the process 
of  final  regulation  by  the  executive,  basically  because  they  need  substantial 
financial  resources  to  operate  properly.  These  resources  are  currently  being 
gathered from a diversity of sources, which implies a high level of maneuvering. At 
the end of 2003, the only program in place is the unemployment insurance, which 
in its first stage is administered by the CCFs and is providing compensation in the 
amount  of  25%  of  the  minimum  wage  for  six  months  to  21.000  unemployed 
household  heads  (about  0.9%  of  the  total  unemployed  or  1.4%  of  the  urban 
unemployed).    
 
B.  Implementation 
 
The qualified technical team in charge of the implementation of the reform was 
lead  by  a  respected  labor/social  economist,  who  unfortunately  died  at  the 
beginning of 2003. After his passing, the leadership has been more diffused, but it 
still keeps a technical “bias”. For the most part, the same team that was involved in   36 
the design of the reform has been in charge of its implementation. Even with the 
change of government in 2002, many of the members of the team that participated 
in the design of the second bill during the Pastrana administration continued to be 
involved in the production of the final bill during the Uribe government, and in the 
implementation of the reform afterwards.  
 
The  new  additions  to the team, however,  had  been interacting  closely  with the 
Pastrana government in the design of the reform through many channels, such as 
specialized seminars, technical discussions and even consultancy work. Moreover, 
many people involved in the design and implementation of the 2002 reform were 
also  involved  in  the  1990  reform.  This  has  been  a  feature  of  policy-making  in 
Colombia,  sometimes  criticized  by  unions  and  congressmen,  but  that  has  lent 
stability and consistency to the reform processes in the country. Thus, it is likely 
that part of the success in passing two politically laden reforms in a little bit over a 
decade is due to the continuity of the reform agenda, and the conviction among 
this group of economists regarding the policy changes needed. 
 
For  the  implementation  of  the  2002  reform  and,  more  generally,  for  the 
implementation of the entire “social protection” reform package, a new government 
agency  was  created,  or  rather  than  created,  it  emerged  as  the  merger  of  two 
ministries: the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (ML) and the Ministry of Health 
(MH).  The  new  institution  was  given  the  Name  of  Ministry  of  Social  Protection 
(MPS).  One  of  the  main  responsibilities,  in  conjunction  with  the  National 
Department of Planning (DNP), is to implement the new labor code, especially in 
what  has  to  do  with  the  proper  functioning  of  the  new  instruments  for  social 
protection, the regulation and monitoring of the apprenticeship program and the 
reform to the job training system.  
 
This  is  an  important  institutional  change  since  previously  most  of  the  technical 
expertise  was  at  DNP,  which  was  the  “natural”  leader  for  design  and 
implementation  of  key  reforms.  Under  the  current  arrangement,  the  MPS  is 
strengthening its technical muscle, departing from a very low base stemming from 
the old ML and the MH. It is important to note that all the public agencies related to 
the labor and social reform are now directly dependent on the MPS, including the 
training agency (SENA) and the Social Security Institute (ISS), among the most 
important. Thus, MPS’ scope of action is ample and its financial muscle as well. 
Therefore, part of the future performance of the labor reform would depend on the 
how successful is the MPS in developing a good technical base that allows it to 
implement correctly the reform, and evaluate its impact.    
 
The  implementation  of  the  2002  reform,  in  its  difficult  aspects  (such  as  the 
apprenticeship  contract  and  the  reform  to  the  training  system),  shows  a  mixed 
panorama. The apprenticeship contract was regulated through a decree issued in 
May 2003 that still needs further  regulation for the instrument to be completely 
operational. The reason for the slow progress seem to lie on the fact that, although 
regulatory decrees need not Congressional approval, opposition from labor unions 
and other powerful interest groups (notably the teachers’ union) has been intense.   37 
Additionally, the Uribe administration focused on economic issues, on reforming 
central government (downsizing and improving its efficiency), and confronting the 
fiscal difficulties. Both of these endeavors require quite unpopular measures, fact 
that forced the President to put on hold further regulatory efforts in the labor arena 
for a while. Regarding the training system, until very recently (December 2003) 
nothing  was  done  on  this  front,  partly  because  of  the  same  reasons  just 
expounded, and partly because there was no agreement within the government on 
what  was  the  best  course  of  reform.  Initial  agreements  were  reached  on 
November- December and thus the subject began to move along, through a decree 
forcing SENA to contract training with private firms in certain circumstances and 
thus, favoring competition in this market and choice on the part of the beneficiaries. 
The issue of certification, crucial for the success of this scheme, has not  been 
resolved however, which implies that a lot of fine-tuning and internal agreement is 
still needed.   
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The  Colombian  experience  with  labor market  reform  during  the  1990s  provides 
some important lessons. First and foremost, difficult policy changes such as the 
ones within the labor market usually take a long time and can hardly be carried out 
rapidly. This is true for the design, approval and implementation processes. When 
the  issues  that  motivate  the  reform  arise,  there  is  a  period  of  awareness  and 
“digestion”, which involves diagnosis and actually coming up with sensible reform 
proposals. Then, there comes a process of consensus building with a very diverse 
set of groups which, as noted in the text, is key to be carried out before going for 
legislative approval. This process starts, many times, by building an agreement 
within the government, a task often neglected or taken for granted, but which may 
entail crucial delays or even the abortion of the whole process, be it in the design, 
negotiation or implementation stage. Then, the process involves other key groups 
within civil society, in which the phase in the “government life cycle” is critical for 
the  actual  likelihood  of  success.  Indeed,  the  first  year  momentum  of  any 
government, when societies accept almost anything the new government presents 
should not be missed. Finally, the formal process of legislative approval reflects the 
basic equilibrium between the political forces.  
 
The key point is that these long and complicated processes require inevitably the 
endurance and the conviction of a large group of individuals (large because usually 
the turnover is high) that keep pushing the key messages and policy changes, 
even if the political landscape changes dramatically during the period. To put it in 
the terms of the paper, the reform effort (the whole “deal”) is composed by a series 
of “sub–deals” that end up ensuring success at the end. It is critical that the team’s 
diagnosis  and  motivation  remains  through  all  the  steps,  which  will  comprise  a 
series of failed and successful deals.  
 
Second, in Colombian seems to be important the fact that the group in charge of 
the design, approval and implementation of the reform was basically the same and 
fairly homogeneous technically and politically. In fact, it was very similar in both   38 
reformist episodes, 1990 and 2002. This assures, among other things, that what is 
implemented is what actually the reformer had in mind. The absence of this “in 
paper  simple”  principle  has  been  an  important  determinant  of  the  failure  or 
important complication or delay in the implementation of other reforms in Colombia. 
 
Third,  within  a  complicated and  politically  laden  reform,  such  as  the  labor  one, 
there  was  a  quite  tricky  issue:  the  parafiscal  tax  system.  Strong  players  and 
stakeholders  who  derive  substantial  rents  from  the  status  quo  become  active 
against the whole reform process. The approach of the “lawyers” in 1999 was to 
avoid this type of confrontation due to the conviction that no gain will be reached 
and probably considerable pain would be inflicted. From the point of view of the 
economists, Real-politik indicated that it was better to comply with this strategy, 
and avoid the risk of jeopardizing success for the entire reform effort.  
 
Finally,  in  relation  to  the  debate  with  the  groups  of  interest,  the  problem  of 
diagnosis  and  of  the  “right  model”  is  deep  and  has  received  little  attention. 
Economic  models  and  empirical  evidence  are  seldom  the  basis  of  analysis  for 
interest groups. Often, they successfully stigmatize the reforms as the culprit for 
unemployment and workers’ income reduction. Selling a better story proves quite 
hard  for  a  technical  staff  barely  experienced  in  the  rhetoric  used  in  those 
battlefields. In contrast, union leaders have made their careers fiercely fighting in 
that milieu. Also, public officials or private managers of the labor market institutions 
that  benefit  from  the  status  quo,  command  substantial  financial  resources  to 
counter the reforming agenda. Politically and financially it is understandable that 
Congress’  reaction  is  normally  cold,  to  say  the  least,  towards  these  type  of 
initiatives. That is why the two reforms presented in this paper have been approved 
during the first year of two administrations that threatened congress with general 
impeachment: the Gaviria and Uribe ones. The Pastrana administration fought for 
it, but did not succeed because, understandably, it was not a priority during its first 
year in office. 
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